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11. Introduction
Analytical models for hardware failure have been extensively investigated in the literature 
along with performability issues [l]. Although the time for different components to fail is usually 
assumed to be exponentially distributed, time-dependent failure rates and graceful degradation 
have been considered [2]. Automatic availability evaluation, assuming a Markov models, is dis­
cussed in [3]. A  job/task flow based model is described in [4], where failure occurrence is assumed 
to be a linear function o f the service requests from a job/task flow. As shown in [5], this linear 
assumption may result in underestimating the effect o f the workload, especially when the load is 
high. A  summary o f research in software reliability growth models is discussed in [6]; run-time 
software reliability modeling is discussed in [7].
Although many authors have addressed the modeling issue and have significantly advanced 
the state o f the art. none have addressed the issue of how to identify the model structure. Further, 
very few  of either the hardware or the software models have been validated with real data. Excep­
tions are the joint hardware/software model discussed in [8] and, a measurement-based model o f 
workload dependent failures discussed in [5], Both, however, describe only the external behavior 
of the system and thus do not provide insight into component-level behavior.
In this paper we build a semi-Markov model to describe the resource-usage/error/recovery 
process in a large mainframe system. The model is based on one year o f low-level error and per­
formance data collected on a production IBM 3081 system running under the MVS operating sys­
tem. The 3081 system consisted o f dual processors with two multiplexed channel sets. Both the 
normal and erroneous behavior o f the system are modeled. A  reward function, based on the service 
rate and the error rate in each state, is defined in order to estimate the performability o f the sys­
tem, and to depict the cost o f different error types and recovery procedures. Two key contribu­
tions of this paper are:
Cl) A  method for identifying a model-structure for the resource-usage/error/recovery process is
introduced and the resulting model is validated against real data.
2(2) It is shown that a semi-Markov model may better represent system behavior as opposed to a 
Markov model.
2. Resource Usage Characterization
In this section we identify a state-transition model to describe the variation in system 
activity. System activity was characterized by measuring a number o f resource usage parameters. 
A statistical clustering technique was then employed to identify a small number of representative 
states.
The resource usage data were collected by sampling, at pre-determined intervals, a number of 
resource usage meters, using the IBM MVS/370 system Resource Measurement Facility (RMF). A  
sample-time of 500 milliseconds was used in this study. Four different resource usage measures 
were used:
CPU -  fraction o f the measured interval for which the CPU is executing instructions,
CHB -  fraction o f the measured interval for which the channel was busy and the CPU was in
the wait state (this parameter is commonly used to measure the degree o f contention in 
a system)
SIO -  number o f successful Start I/O and Resume I/O instructions issued to the channel
DASD -  number o f requests serviced on the direct access storage devices
At any interval o f time the measured workload is represented by a point in a 4-dimensional space, 
(CPU, CHB, SIO. DASD). Statistical cluster analysis is used to divide the workload into similar 
classes according to a pre-defmed criterion. This allows us to concisely describe the dynamics o f 
system behavior and extract a structure that already exists in the workload data.1
Each cluster (defined by its centroid) is then used to depict a system state and. a state- 
transition diagram (consisting o f inter-cluster transition probabilities and cluster sojourn times) is 
developed. A  ¿-means clustering algorithm [10] is used for cluster analysis. The algorithm parti­
tions an iV-dimensional population into k sets on the basis o f a sample. The k non-empty clusters 
sought, C VC 2.... C*. are such that the sum of the squares o f the Euclidean distances o f the cluster
k
members from their centroids, £  £  11xi —Xj 112, is minimized, where x} is the centroid o f cluster
j = l  x i fCJ
Similar clustering techniques are also used for workload characterization in [9],
3< v
Two types o f workload clusters were formed. In the first case CPU and CHB were selected to 
be the workload variables. This combination was found to best describe the CPU-bound load 
(nearly 60% o f the observations have a CPU usage greater than 0.72). In the second case the clus­
ters were formed considering SIO and DASD as the workload variables. This combination was 
found to best describe the I/O workload. In this paper, only the results for CPU-bound load clus­
ters are presented. Details o f I/O activity can be found in [ l l ] .  Table 1 shows the results o f the 
clustering operation. The table shows that about 36% o f the time the CPU was heavily loaded 
(0.96) and almost 76% o f the time the CPU load was above 0.5. Since the measured system con­
sisted o f two-processors, we may say that 76% o f the time at least one o f the processors is busy. A 
state-transition diagram o f CPU-bound load activity is shown in Figure 1. Note that a null state. 
W0, has been incorporated to represent the state o f the system during the non-measured period. 
The time spent in the null state was assumed to be zero. The transition probability from  state i to 
state j . Pi was estimated from the measured data using:
observed no. o f transitions from state i to state j
Pij = ---------------------------------------------- — ----------------------- -- .
observed no. o f transitions from state i
Cluster % o f Mean Mean Std dev Std dev
id obs o f  CPU o f  CHB o f  CPU o f  CHB
7.44 0.0981 0.1072 0.0462 0.0436
0.50 0.1126 0.5525 0.0433 0.0669
2.73 0.1547 0.2801 0.0647 0.0755
12.41 0.3105 0.1637 0.0550 0.0459
0.74 0.3639 0.3819 0.0365 0.1923
17.12 0.5416 0.1287 0.0560 0.0511
22.58 0.7207 0.0848 0.0576 0.0301
-  w . 36.48 0.9612 0.0168 0.0362 0.0143
¿ r  o f c p u  - 0.9724
R2 o f CHB - 0.8095
overall R2 - 0.9604
2
R  : the square o f correlation coefficient
Table 1. Characteristics o f CPU-bound workload clusters
4Figure 1. State-transition diagram o f CPU-bound load 
In the next section the characterization of the errors and the recovery process is discussed. 
The appropriate error and recovery states are identified for subsequent use in developing an overall 
model.
3. Error and R ecovery Characterization
The IBM system has built-in error detection facilities and there are many provisions for 
hardware and software initiated recovery through retry and redundancy. The error and recovery 
data are automatically logged by the operating system as the errors occur. On the occurrence o f an 
error the operating system creates a time-stamped record describing the error, the state o f the 
machine at the time o f the error and, the result o f the hardware and/or software attempts to 
recover from the error. Details o f this logging mechanism are described in [12]. Due to the manner 
in which errors are detected and reported in a computer system, it is possible that a single fault 
may manifest itself as more than one error, depending on the activity at the time o f the error. The
5different manifestations may not all be identical [13]. The system recovery usually treats these 
errors as isolated incidents. Thus, the raw data can be biased by error records relating to the same 
problem. In order to address this problem, two levels o f data reduction were performed. First, a 
coalescing algorithm described in [5] was used to analyze the data and merge observations which 
occur in rapid succession and relate to the same problem. Next, a reduction technique described in
[13] to automatically group records most likely to have a common cause was used. By using these 
two methods, the errors were classified into five different classes. These classes are called error 
events since they may contain more than one error and are explained below:
CPU : Errors which affect the normal operation o f the CPU: may originate in the CPU, in the
main memory, or in a channel
CHAN : Channel errors (the great majority are recovered)
DASD : Disk errors, recoverable (by  data correction, hardware instruction retry or software
instruction retry) and non-recoverable disk
SWE : Software incidents due to invalid supervisor calls, program checks and other software
exception conditions
MULT : Multiple errors affecting more than one type o f component (i.e., involving more than
one o f the above)
Table 2 lists the frequencies o f different types of errors. Notice that about 17% o f errors are 
classified as multiple errors (MULT). A  MULT error is mostly due to a single cause but the fault 
has non-identical manifestations, provoked by different types o f system activity. Since the man­
ifestations are non-identical, recovery may be complex and hence can (as w ill be seen later) impose 
considerable overhead on the system.
Type o f  error Frequency Percent
CPU 2 0.04
CHAN 119 2.23
MULT 924 17.33
SWE 1923 36.07
DASD 2364 44.33
total 5332 100.00
Table 2. Frequency o f errors
6Figure 2. Flow chart o f recovery processes
The recovery procedures were divided into four categories based on recovery cost, which was 
measured in terms o f the system overhead required to handle an error. The lowest level (hardware 
recovery), involves the use o f an error correction code (ECC) or hardware instruction retry and has 
minimal overhead. If hardware recovery is not possible (or unsuccessful), software controlled 
recovery is invoked. This could be simple, e.g., terminating the current program or task in control, 
or complex, e.g.. invoking specially designed recovery routine(s) to handle the problem. The third 
level, alternative (ALT), involves transferring the tasks to functioning processors) when one o f 
the processors experiences an un-recoverable error. If no on-line recovery is possible, the system is 
brought down for off-line (OFFL) repair. Figure 2 shows a flow chart o f the recovery process. The 
time spent in each recovery state was taken to be constant, since each recovery type except OFFL
I
requires almost constant overhead.2
2 Hardware recovery involves hardware instruction retry or ECC correction. The maximum number o f retries is 
predetermined. Each CPU has a 26-nanosecond machine cycle time and the disk seek time is about 25 milliseconds. We 
estimate a worst case hardware recovery cost o f 0.5 seconds, i.e. incorporating twenty I/O retries: ten through the original 
I/O path and another ten through an alternative I/O  path if the alternative is available. This, o f course, over estimates the 
cost o f hardware retry used for the CPU errors. Similarly, the worst-case software recovery time was estimated to be 1 
second. The ALT state was not evaluated since it did not occur in the data. For OFFL the time was calculated to be 1 hour 
based on our experience and through discussion with maintenance engineers.
74. Resource-Usage/Error/Recovery M odel
In this section we combine the separate workload, error and recovery models developed into a 
single model shown in Figure 3. The null state W0 is not shown in this diagram. The model has 
three different classes o f states: normal operation states (SN), error states (Sg), and recovery states 
(5g). Under normal conditions, the system makes transitions from one workload state to another. 
The occurrence of an error results in a transition to one o f the error states. The system then goes 
into one or more recovery modes after which, with a high probability, it returns to one o f the 
"good" workload states3. The state transition diagram shows that nearly 98.3% o f hardware 
recovery requests and 99.7% o f software recovery requests are successful. Thus the error
Figure 3. State-transition diagram o f resource-usage/error/recovery model
3 Note that the transition probabilities from  W ^ to W g are different from those in figure 1 where error states were not 
considered in computing the transition probabilities.
8detection, fault isolation and on-line recovery mechanisms allow the measured system to handle an 
error efficiently and effectively. In less than 1% o f the cases is the system not able to recover.
One state which needs further elaboration is the MULT state. Recall that a MULT state 
denotes a multiple error event affecting more than one component type. Figure 4 shows the state- 
transition diagram o f a MULT error event, i.e., the transition diagram given a MULT error. The 
model quantifies the interactions between the different components in a multiple error occurrence. 
From the diagram, it is seen that in about 65% o f the cases a multiple error starts as a software 
error (SWE) and in 32% o f the cases it starts as a disk error (DASD). Given that a disk error has 
occurred, there is nearly a 30% chance that a software error w ill follow . It is also interesting to 
note that there is a 64% chance that one software error w ill be followed by another different 
software error.
entry to
Figure 4. State-transition diagram o f a given multiple error (MULT)
94.1. Distributions fo r  W orkload and Error States
Table 3 shows the characteristics o f both the workload and error states in terms o f their wait­
ing times. An examination o f the mean and standard deviation o f the waiting times indicates that 
not all waiting times are simple exponentials. This is particularly pronounced for the error states.
W orkload Error
Mean Standard Mean Standard
State w aiting tim e deviation State w aiting tim e deviation
w . 1263.71 1384.20 CPU * *
^ 2 289.65 1.19 CHAN 5.08 18.31
^ 3 698.79 913.30 SWE 41.35 103.35
1203.05 1130.28 DASD 120.86 223.89
Ws 613.74 421.73 MULT 293.28 262.84
w 6 1380.86 1588.76
w 7 1071.31 1004.46
1612.72 2576.35
* statistically insignificant
Table 3. Characteristics o f waiting time (seconds) 
in workload and error states
0 20 40 £0 , 80 . 100 120
Duration (minutes)
(b). Holding time density from W8 to SWE state 
Figure 5. Waiting and holding time densities
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Figure 5(a) and 5(b) shows the densities o f waiting time for Ws state and also the specific holding 
time to the SWE error state. The waiting time for state i is the time that the process spends in 
state i before making a transition to any other state. The holding time for a transition from  state i 
to state j  is the time that the process spends in state i before making a transition to state j  [14]. 
This is the same as the distribution o f a one-step transition from state i to j . The distributions in 
figure 5 are fitted to phase-type exponential density functions [15] and, tested by using the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test at a 0.01 significance level.
4.2. E rror Duration Distributions
Recall that an error event can involve more than one error and since errors frequently occur 
in bursts. During an error burst the system goes into an error - >  recovery cycle until the error 
condition disappears4. In such cases we measure the duration o f an error event as the time 
difference between the first detected error and the last detected error, caused by the same event. 
The duration o f an error event can be used to measure the severity o f the error. Since each 
recovery type takes approximately a constant amount o f time, the loss o f work can be approxi­
mated by the error rate in this period. In section 6. we use this information to build a reward 
model for the system. Figure 6 shows examples o f error duration densities for two different types 
of errors. SWE and MULT.
In summary, we have developed a state-transition model which describes the normal and 
error behavior o f the system. A  key characteristic o f the model is that the waiting time in some of 
the workload states and in most error states cannot be modeled as simple exponentials. Further­
more. the holding times from a given workload state to different error states are dependent on the 
destinations. Thus, the overall system is modeled as a complex irreducible semi-Markov process.
4This is typical o f many systems (e.g. see [8] ). The final recovery usually occurs because the conditions which 
triggered the error disappear due to change in system activity.
11
Prob. 0.5
0.0
0 5 10 15
Duration (min.)
(a). Waiting time density for SWE
/ ( i )  =  0.041181 e 
+  0.0002704 e
—0.044518*
-0.0036075*
Figure 6. Error duration densities
5. M odel Behavior Analysis
Now that we have an overall model, we show the usage o f this model to predict key system 
characteristics. The mean time between different types o f errors is evaluated along with model 
characteristics, such as the occupancy probabilities o f key normal and error states.
5.1. General Characteristics
By solving the semi-Markov model, we find that the modeled system made a transition every 
9 minutes and 8 seconds, on average. In comparing this with the mean time between errors 
(MTBE) listed in Table 4, it is clear that most often the transitions are from one normal state to 
another. The table also shows that a DASD error was detected almost every 52 minutes (0.87 
hours) while a software error was detected every 1 hour and 45 minutes. Most o f the DASD errors 
(95%) were recovered through hardware recovery (i.e.. hardware instruction retry or ECC). thus 
resulting in negligible overhead. Table 4 also lists the mean recurrence time for recovery states.
12
Error states Recovery states
CPU CHAN SWE DASD MULT HWR SWR ALT OFFL
- 26.88 1.75 0.87 4.62 0.62 2.57 - 651.37
Table 4. Mean recurrence time (hours) o f error and recovery states 
Thus, the on-line hardware recovery routine is invoked once every 0.62 hours, while the software 
recovery occurs every 2.57 hours. By using an estimated time for each hardware recovery and 
comparing the results with the recovery overhead, we estimate that the cost o f hardware recovery 
is only 0.02% o f total computation time. The mean recurrence time o f the alternative recovery 
routine was not estimated, due to lack o f data, i.e., this event seldom occurred.
5.2. Summary M odel Probabilities
Since the process is modeled as an irreducible semi-Markov process, we can evaluate the fo l­
lowing steady state parameters [14]:
(1) occupancy probability ( $ p  -  the probability that the process occupies state j ,
(2) conditional entrance probability ([tTj ) -  given that the process is now making a transition, the
probability that the transition is to state /
(3) entrance rate (e} ) -  the rate at which the process enters state j  at any time
instance \fij-------- , where r  is the mean time between
r
transitions)
(4) mean recurrence time (0^ ) -  mean time between successive entries into state j
The model characteristics are summarized in Table 5. A  dashed line in this table indicates a 
negligible value (statistically insignificant). Table 5(a) shows the normal system behavior. For 
example, given that a transition occurs the system is most likely to go to states W 1 or W8. This is 
also reflected in the respective entrance rates and occupancy probabilities for the mentioned states. 
From the occupancy probabilities ($>) we see that almost 34% o f the time the CPU load is as high as 
0.96 (W 8); 39% of the time the CPU is moderately loaded (1V6 + W7). Table 5(b) shows the error 
behavior o f the system. The table shows that about 30% o f the transitions are to an error state 
(obtained by summing all the tt s  for all the error states). The DASD errors have the highest
13
Normal state
Measure W „ w , w 2 w 3 w 4 w 5 w 6 w , w „
<£> 0 0.0625 0.0008 0.0136 0.1258 0.0054 0.1639 0.2255 0.3398
7T 0.0257 0.0264 0.0014 0.0104 0.0559 0.0047 0.0635 0.1125 0.1127
0.00005 0.00005 - 0.00002 0.0001 0.00001 0.00012 0.00021 0.00021
0 5.78 5.62 102.56 14.32 2.65 31.38 2.33 1.32 1.32
(a). Normal states
Error state R ecovery state
Measure CPU CHAN SWE DASD MULT HWR SWR ALT OFFL
<ï> - 0.00005 0.0066 0.0383 0.0179 0.00022 0.00011 - -
7r - 0.0055 0.0850 0.1692 0.0322 0.2379 0.0572 - 0.00023
e - 0.00001 0.00016 0.00032 0.00006 0.00045 0.00011 - -
0 - 26.88 1.75 0.87 4.62 0.62 2.57 - 651.37
(b). Error and recovery states
• sec *• in hours
Table 5. Summary o f model characteristics
entrance probability. For the data shown in the table it can be estimated that an error is detected, 
on the average, every 30 minutes. Of course, over 98% o f these errors incur negligible overhead.
An interesting characteristic o f the multiple errors is also seen in Table 5(b). Although the 
entrance probability o f a MULT error is lower than that for SWE, its occupancy probability is 
higher. This is due to the fact that a MULT error event has a longer mean waiting time as compared 
to SWE error events (293 seconds versus 41 seconds).
5 3 . Model Validation
Even though our model is developed from real data, it needs to be validated since the model 
identification process, e.g., the workload clustering, allow us to only approximate the real system 
behavior. In order to evaluate the validity o f the model, three measures evaluated via the model 
were compared with direct calculations from the actual data. Table 6 shows the comparison o f the 
occupancy probabilities for key normal states (occupancy probability greater than 0.1) and for one
14
key error state (DASD).5 The table also shows the comparison for the mean recurrence time (0 )  of 
the SWE error event and for its standard deviation (Std). It can be seen that all the predicted 
values are around 3 percent or less, indicating that the proposed semi-Markov model is an accurate 
estimator o f the real system behavior. This also provides support for the model structure 
identification method employed in this paper.
5.4. M arkov Versus Sem i-M arkov
This section investigates the significance o f using a semi-Markov model to describe the overall 
resource-usage/error/recovery process. It has been argued that since errors only occur infrequently 
(i.e., X is small), a Markov model may well approximate the real behavior. Clearly, if only the 
first moments, e.g., MTBE. are o f interest the Markov model provides adequate information. If the 
distributions (e.g., the time to error distribution) or higher moments are o f interest the Markov 
model may be inadequate. Thus, although our evidence shows that the semi-Markov process is a 
better model, i.e.. more closely approximates the data from the measured system, it is reasonable to 
ask what deviations occur if a Markov process is assumed. In order to answer this question we use 
a Markov model to describe our system and compare the results with those obtained through the 
more realistic semi-Markov model.
<D 0 Std
W , w , W , DASD SWE SWE
M odel 0.1258 0.1639 0.2255 0.3398 0.0383 1.75 2.18
Actual 0.1259 0.1634 0.2311 0.3452 0.0386 1.72 2.11
€
0.0008 ; 0.0031 0.0242 0.0156 0.0156 0.022 0.033A ctual
6 : the absolute error, I Model -  Actual I
Table 6. Comparison of i>, 0  and standard deviation
* The Actual' values are calculated from  observed data. For example:
total time that the system was observed to be in state i
% m
length o f the observation period
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We compared the two by calculating two steady state parameters. The first is the complemen­
tary distribution of the time to error (referred to as R(t)) for different error types. The second is 
the standard deviation o f R(t). The results for the SWE state are shown in Table 7. It is clear that 
the Markov model over estimates the R(t) in the early life (for low  time to error probabilities) and 
under estimates R(t) for high time to error probabilities. The standard deviation is also consider­
able under estimated by the Markov model thus casting doubts on the validity o f using MTBE esti­
mates themselves.
In summary, our measurements show that using a Markov model is optimistic in the short 
run and pessimistic in the long run. The underestimation of the standard deviation o f R(t) is also a 
serious problem because it calls into question the representativeness o f the MTBE estimates.
6. Perform ability  Analysis
In this section we use the workload/error/recovery model to evaluate the performability o f 
the system. Reward functions are used to depict the performance degradation due to errors and 
also due to different types o f recovery procedures. Since the recovery overhead for each recovery 
state in the modeled system is approximately constant, the total recovery overhead for each error 
event and thus the reward depends on the error rate during that event. Thus, higher the error rate 
during an error event, the higher is the recovery overhead and. hence lower the reward. On this 
basis we define a reward the reward rate. r i (per unit time) for each state o f the model as follows:
R(t) Std (mins)
semi-Markov 0.99 0.61 0.44 0.32 0.24 0.18 0.14 0.10 28.63
Markov 1.00 0.71 0.50 0.35 0.25 0.17 0.12 0.09 25.13
Time (mins) 0 7.5 15.0 22.5 30.0 37.5 45.0 52.5
Table 7. Comparison between Markov and semi-Markov
16
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where, the and et are the service rate and the error rate in state i , respectively. Thus one unit o f 
reward is given for each unit o f time when the process stays in the good states SN. The penalty 
paid depends on the number o f errors generated by an error event. With an increasing number of 
errors the penalty per unit time increases, and accordingly, the reward rate decreases. Zero reward 
is assigned to recovery states. Based on this proposal, reward rates for the error states are as 
shown in Table 8.
The reward rate o f the modeled system at time t is a random variable X (i) .  which is defined
as
1 process is in state i € SN
XCt) =  r  -% process is in state i e SE
0 otherwise.
Therefore the expected reward rate E [X (i)] can be evaluated from E [X (i)] =  £  (t > .  . The
cumulative reward by time t is Y (i ) — J X(cr)d ct and the expected cumulative reward is given by
o
[16]:
E[Y(f )] = E f  X(cr)d< =  TriJpiWdcr,
i 0
where ^ ¡ ( i )  is the probability o f being in state i at time i .  In order to evaluate pf( i )  and hence 
other measures, we convert the semi-Markov process into a Markov process using the method o f 
stages [15,17]. The state probability vector P*(i ) =  ( . . . .^ ( i )....) o f the Markov process can be
State DASD SWE CHAN MULT
ri 0.5708 0.2736 0.9946 0.2777
Table 8. Reward rates for error states
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derived from P ( i )  =  P (0) e®* , where P (0) =  (1.0,...,0) and Q is transition rate matrix o f the 
Markov process [14].
In order to study the performance degradation due to different types o f errors, the irreducible 
semi-Markov process was transformed by considering the OFFL (off-line repair) state as the 
absorbing state. The expected reward calculated with this assumption indeed reflects the true per- 
formability until system failure. Next, for evaluating the impact o f different error events we first 
observe that often these events have significant error duration time (e.g.. MULT state has an mean 
error duration of 5 minutes with a standard deviation of 4 minutes). Since the majority o f jobs 
last less than a few  minutes, as far as a user program is concerned, an entry into an long duration 
error state is similar to entering an absorption state with rf >0 . Thus, the impact o f the MULT can 
be evaluated by making it into an absorption state with ri > 0 . A  similar analysis can be performed 
for other error states.6
In our analysis, we first make the OFFL state the absorbing state. This gives the expected per­
formance until an off-line failure. Then we evaluate three other cases.
a) OFFL case (OFFL),
b) MULT and OFFL case (MULT).
c) SWE. MULT and OFFL case (SWE), and
d) DASD. MULT and OFFL case (DASD),
Case (a) gives the overall performability o f the system assuming that OFFL (off-line repair) is the 
absorbing state, i.e., the impact o f all other error events are taken into account. This gives both the 
transient and steady state performability o f the system. Next we assume in case (b ) that both 
MULT and OFFL are absorbing. The difference between (a) and (b) approximates the expected per­
formance loss due to possible entry into a long duration MULT state. Similarly, the difference 
between (a) and (c) provides an estimate o f loss o f performance due to entry into an SWE state. In 
the long term, o f course, each w ill reach a steady state value. The above analyses were performed
tfAn alternative approach, the performance loss (PL) based on the steady state occupancy probabilities, was suggested 
by one o f the referees. PL, =  r ,)  +  £  where is the probability o f visiting a recovery state r  after an
error state t .
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on the resulting Markov reward model o f the system using SHARPE (the Symbolic Hierarchical 
Automated Reliability and Performance Evaluator)7 developed at Duke University:
The curves o f Figure 7 show the expected reward rate at time t , E[X(? )], for these four cases. 
The evaluations of the cumulative reward. E [Y(i)]. is discussed in [ l l ] .  In practical terms the 
differences provide an estimate o f the loss in reward due to various error types assuming that the 
jobs are initiated when the system is fu lly  operational. As an example, in Figure 7. we find that 
that the SWE event degrades system effectiveness considerably more than the DASD event. This is 
because the reward rate o f SWE error is lower than DASD error even though the error probability
Figure 7. Expected reward rate. E[X(t)]
7 SHARPE is a modeling t o o l . It provides several model types ranging from reliability block diagrams to complex semi 
Markov models [17].
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of DASD event is higher than o f SWE event.
7. Conclusion
In this study, we have proposed a methodology to construct a model o f resource usage, error 
and recovery in a computer system, using real data from a production system. The semi-Markov 
model obtained is capable o f reflecting both the normal and error behavior qf our measured system. 
The errors are classified into various types, based on the components involved. Both hardware and 
software errors are considered, and the interaction between the system components (hardware and 
software) is reflected in a multiple error model. The proposed reward measure allows us to predict 
the performability o f the system based on the service and error rates. It is suggested that other 
production systems be similarly analyzed so that a body o f realistic data on computer error and 
recovery models is available.
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